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Abstract
Many early-stage biotech companies face a significant funding gap when trying to develop a new drug
from preclinical development to a proof of concept clinical trial. This funding gap is sometimes referred
to as the "valley of death", a reflection of the vast number of companies that are unable to raise the
needed capital to progress into the clinic.
The suggestion behind the "valley of death" phrase is that companies that should be able to attract
investment do not get funded, because (1) the technical risks inherent in taking a new drug through
clinical trials are high, (2) a significant amount of capital is needed to finance clinical development, and
(3) the time horizon of investment is on the order of 6-8 years. Ultimately, the valley of death reflects
the perceived imbalance of risk and reward for an investment at this stage as well as the resulting
difficulty for a biotech company in raising capital during this time.
For companies focused on a neglected disease, this risk/reward profile is even more skewed, with
significantly greater market risks and fewer exit opportunities for an investor. As a result, the "valley of
death" phenomenon for a global health company developing a therapeutic for a neglected disease is
even more pronounced As a result, private sector funding for translational research of neglected
disease therapeutics has beeri severely lacking.
In an effort to spur more private sector investment into the development of neglected disease
therapeutics, several market design mechanisms have been developed including Advanced Market
Commitments (AMCs) and Priority Review Vouchers (PRVs). These market design mechanisms are new
and unproven. To date venture capital has not yet flowed in a meaningful way into startup companies
focusing on neglected diseases. This is partially attributable to uncertainties surrounding the credibility
and value of the incentives, but it also raises the question of whether these incentives will be sufficient
to attract venture investment to a small biotech company focused on neglected diseases.
The objective of this thesis is to explore the potential impact of these market design mechanisms on the
financial prospects of early stage, pre-revenue biotech companies focused on neglected diseases,
including an evaluation of whether the incentives will be sufficient to attract venture investment to the
company. To accomplish this, a simulation model was created to compare the relative impacts of these
incentive schemes on a small biotech company focused exclusively on a neglected disease therapeutic.
The simulation data presented herein reflect the inherent tensions between the social benefit of a
neglected disease therapeutic and the need for investors to pursue a financial return commensurate
with the risk of the investment. I conclude that, while market design mechanisms like PRVs and AMCs
are an intriguing first step, a dual market strategy is likely still necessary for a neglected disease
company to attract private investment.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview of Neglected Disease Investments in R&D
Global R&D spending for neglected diseases, defined here as diseases that have a predominant
incidence in developing countries, has historically been very low relative to that for developed country
diseases. According to the G-FINDER study conducted by The George Institute for International Health
in 2008, a total of $2.5B was spent on neglected disease R&D in 2007, with 80% of that funding going
towards the "Big Three" diseases of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Moreover, 90% of these
investments in neglected disease research came from non-industry sources such as the NIH and the
Gates Foundation (1).
By contrast, in 2008 the biopharmaceutical industry spent a total of an estimated $65.2B in R&D across
all diseases (2), with a significant portion of that spending being applied towards chronic diseases that
predominantly afflict the developed world such as cancer, stroke, diabetes, and Alzheimer's disease (3).
A comparison of the ratios of R&D spend by disease burden further illuminates the inequities. Using
Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), a measure of the number of healthy years of life lost due to
premature death and disability and a proxy for the overall burden of disease, as the denominator, a
disproportionate amount of total R&D spend goes into primarily developed country diseases (see Figure
1), even with high frequency diseases like schistosomiasis, a helminth infection that has a global
prevalence of 207 million people (4).
Figure 1: Total R&D Spending per DALY, from both public and private sectors. Data collected from BIO Ventures for Global
Health website (4) and G-FINDER report (5)
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Chagas disease, another parasitic infection, had only $8.17M of research funding invested, even though
the incidence is 750,000, 25 million people are at risk, there are no effective treatments available for
chronic infection, and therapies available for acute infection have severe side effects (6). By way of
contrast, the incidence of Parkinson's Disease (PD) in the US is approximately 50,000 (7), but the illness
attracts nearly a quarter of a billion dollars of R&D spend annually in the United States from public/NGO
sectors alone (8; 9). Industry is also investing in PD R&D, including no less than 48 clinical studies
currently underway for drug-based therapeutic interventions of the disease (10).
These inequities in spending are not baseless, of course. Given that approximately 80% of the
schistosomiasis patient population lives in sub-Saharan Africa (6), a market for an effective
schistosomiasis therapeutic would certainly not provide the same return on investment as a diabetes
drug with a global market size greater than $21B (11), let alone allow the firm to recoup its R&D
investment.
This problem can be framed in terms of a two general market failures. One problem is the time-
inconsistent incentives for NGOs and government bodies. In the context of improving global health, the
goal of these organizations is to create incentives for private sector R&D investment into neglected
diseases. To optimize quality of the product and speed to market, a "more R&D is better" perspective is
warranted. When a candidate drug is developed and approved, however, these same organizations
become the purchasers of the drug and therefore, given budget constraints, want the lowest price
possible. The time-inconsistent incentives of these socially-motivated entities increase perceived risk to
the private sector, further limiting its interest in investing in neglected disease R&D.
The second market failure has to do with technological spillover and its effect on incentives. Developing
world countries have little incentive to fund R&D directly, because they know that any advances made
by other countries will ultimately benefit them. In economic terms, this market failure reflects the fact
that neglected disease R&D is viewed as a public good by developing countries, limiting their incentive
to directly fund R&D.
Market forces are obviously at work, but these inequalities between R&D investment and global burden
of disease highlight the importance, and the difficulty, in getting more private sector investment into
these neglected disease programs'. Several of the market design mechanisms that will be discussed in
this thesis attempt to address this imbalance by increasing the private return for the neglected diseases,
while others aim to reduce the risk inherent in the drug development process.
1 An implicit assumption is being made that society would be better off with more investment going in to neglected
disease R&D.
1.2 The Valley of Death
"Between basic discovery research and late-stage development lies the critical step of
proving the utility of a proposed drug. The funding gap that often occurs in this period has
been referred to as the 'valley of death'. The risks are great and may be considered as not
worth taking for products designed to treat rare and neglected diseases, which may
ultimately yield a very limited return on investment" (12).
The obstacles facing any life science entrepreneur are significant, particularly when aiming to discover,
develop, and commercialize a new drug. Risks are abundant, including technical hurdles (can it be
scaled?), clinical risk (will it be safe and effective?), market risk (is the underlying medical need sufficient
to command robust pricing?), reimbursement risk (will providers lose money on my product?) and
regulatory uncertainties from the FDA, just to name a few. As such, any business plan for a therapeutics
company has to address these risks as well as offer an investor the potential for rewards commensurate
with this risk profile.
Venture capital is one class of investor that has historically had some success in the high risk, high
reward investment profile inherent to biotechnology. The biotech venture model is to invest significant
amounts of capital (anywhere from $3M-$30M over several rounds) into high growth potential
companies, provide the company with non-monetary support such as access to the VCs industry
network, and then exit the investment after 2-5 years via either an IPO or a trade sale, achieving a
multiple return on investment. Given that these investments are high risk, the desired reward is often
on the order of 5-10x the original investment, such that the inevitable losses from the overall portfolio
are covered and the fund has a positive internal rate of return (IRR) (13). Performance data for early
stage venture funds (across all industry sectors) show a median IRR of 60% (14), illustrating the high bar
for expected return on any given investment considering the high risk of failure across the portfolio.
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More recently, multiples closer to 2-3x have been stated as a targeted return, particularly for investors
looking at Phase II programs (15).
Given the large amounts of high-risk capital needed to progress a therapeutic candidate through to
commercialization and the fund-returning exit opportunities offered by a big pharma acquisition (see
Table 1), it is not surprising that venture capital has historically been interested in putting its money to
work in this sector.
Table 1: Selected Biotech Acquisitions, 2006-2008
CV Therapeutics Gilead $1.4B 2009
Sirtris GlaxoSmithKline $724M 2008
Artemis Boehringer-lngleheim $515M 2008
Reliant GlaxoSmithKline $2.75B 2007
Sirna Merck $1.13B 2006
Indeed, VCs have played a significant role in spurring innovation in the biotech sector by providing at risk
capital to firms that are years away from having any appreciable product revenues. Between 2002 and
2008, over $50B of venture capital investment went into life sciences companies (16). In 2006, venture
backed life science companies supported nearly 500,000 jobs and generated $132B in revenue (17).
While data around venture capital performance in biotech is difficult to collect, estimated overall
venture capital performance of 24% as reported by Lerner, Schoar, and Wong (14) and subsequent
levels of fundraising for biotech venture funds together suggest that investor dollars have continued to
flow into venture capital funds with life sciences foci.2
2 Data subsequent to the Lerner et al study (14) show an overall decline in total venture capital dollars raised
across all sectors, including life sciences. (16)
Figure 2: Life Science Venture Capital Fundraising Data, 2002-2006 (16)
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So what is the funding "valley of death", and why does the phrase exist even for small biotechs focused
on developed world indications? First, the phrase itself refers to the time between preclinical
development of a drug and its demonstration of initial efficacy in a human proof of concept trial.
A full evaluation of why this funding gap exists is beyond the scope of this research, but the short
answer is that biotech companies are "de-risked" as they pass through each stage of development. In
other words, the probability of successful approval and commercialization of a drug goes up with each
successful clinical trial, creating a value inflection point for the company at each of these milestones.
VCs make investments to finance these inflection points, such that the next round of financing comes at
a higher valuation. While the first human trial offers one such inflection point, a much bigger jump
comes after the larger, pivotal clinical trial. Therefore, many VCs will look to make investments after a
Phase I trial has yielded some clinical data but before the pivotal Phase 2b or Phase III trial where clinical
efficacy is most fully evaluated. Waiting to invest until after Phase I also provides a time horizon benefit,
as it shortens the developmental timeline from 6-8 years (preclinical to commercialization) to 4-6 years
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(post-proof of concept to commercialization), which has a positive effect on IRR, one metric used to
evaluate venture fund performance. This preference for later stage investing, though, has resulted in
the "gap" in funds available to translate an otherwise promising discovery through early stage
development. The term "valley of death" has been given to this phenomenon.
For a small, early-stage biotech company focused on a neglected disease, the story is worse. In addition
to all of the risks mentioned for a "traditional" biotech, an investor would look at a developing world
indication with an even sharper eye.
For global health companies, market risks are exceedingly high due to several factors - extraordinary
revenue concerns, lack of established delivery channels, and imprecise forecasting (18). The revenue
concerns are obvious. The target population in most countries cannot support pricing for medications
that will provide an adequate return on investment. And it is not even close; the prices for one dose of
many developed world drugs exceeds the total per capita spend on ALL health care in many developing
world countries (see Figure 3). As one example, generic simvastatin (200mg dose) costs $72 per year
for a US consumer at Costco.com (19). This figure is more than the total amount spent per capita in
Angola and Niger combined. The economics for branded drugs are, not surprisingly, much more drastic.
Celecoxib (Celebrex) costs $1416 per year in the US (19), a more than 8-fold increase over the total
health care spend per capita per year for Tanzania, Angola, Malawi, and Niger combined.
Figure 3: US Drug Annual Costs (19) and Total Health Care Spending for Selected Countries (20).
Revenue is not the only concern, however. A lack of established delivery channels and a lack of reliable
demand forecasting create significant uncertainties around penetration rates for a new therapeutic,
making cash flow predictions extraordinarily challenging for either an investor or a potential acquirer.
How a venture investor exits the investment and realizes a return, i.e. how it will achieve liquidity in its
investment, is also a major question for a global health entrepreneur. Most big pharma companies have
not created sales and distribution channels into developing world markets such as Africa, and would
thus have little use for a drug that has low pricing, uncertain potential, and would offer no economies of
scale or scope. If big pharma isn't interested in the market, and by extension would not be interested in
a potential acquisition, a venture capitalist is unlikely to make an investment.
Taken together, market uncertainties around pricing, delivery channels, and limited liquidity for
investors exacerbate the "valley of death" for global health entrepreneurs. As a result, it has been
difficult for companies focused on these indications to obtain any type of translational funding.
1.3 Responding to the Problem
Global health economists, government bodies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
collaborated to search for ways to address this lack of investment in R&D for neglected diseases. A
number of potential market design initiatives have been proposed.
These mechanisms can be divided into two broad categories of "push" and "pull", depending on the
economic incentive that is being applied. Simply stated, push strategies subsidize research inputs
whereas pull strategies reward research outputs. These strategies will be explored in more detail in the
next section, but by way of introduction, the following are some examples:
Table 2: Example Strategies to Spur Innovation in Neglected Disease R&D
Push Pull
Direct Financing - Grants Advanced Market Commitments (AMCs)
Patent Pooling Priority Review Vouchers (PRVs)
Resource Reallocations Fast Track Option (FTO)
X-prize* X-prize*
*The primary incentive is pull, but a push-like effect will be discussed
Several of these mechanisms are new, especially in the "Pull" column, and data on their effectiveness in
meeting their objectives are scarce. With that said, there is discernable excitement regarding the
potential of some of these strategies.
1.4 Objective and Scope of the Research
The goal of this thesis is to explore the potential impact of these market design mechanisms on the
financial prospects of early stage, pre-revenue biotech companies focused on global health.
Perspectives of the entrepreneur, venture capitalist, donors, NGOs, and pharmaceutical companies will
be explored. However, the ultimate aim of this work is to produce guidance for global health
entrepreneurs on the potential impact of these various market design mechanisms.
The scope of this work is limited to therapeutics for global health where there is no apparent developed
world market. Where a developed world market exists, differential pricing options offer the potential
for firms to recoup their investments in R&D, thereby reducing the need for market design mechanisms
(21). While a financing problem also exists for medical devices and diagnostics for neglected diseases,
the amount of capital required for their development and commercialization is typically significantly
less. Moreover, no market based mechanisms have been introduced for devices or diagnostics. While
still a significant problem, the focus of this thesis will be limited to therapeutics.
The development of efficient and effective drug distribution channels will be critical if gains made in
spurring innovation in neglected disease therapeutics are to be fully realized. A significant amount of
research and work is being done in this area, and its importance cannot be overstated, but it is also
beyond the scope of this research.
Chapter 2: Market Design Mechanisms
In an effort to spur more private sector investment, global health economists, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and government bodies have worked to construct market design mechanisms
that aim to adjust the risk/reward profile for an investment (see Figure 4). These strategies create
incentives by either subsidizing research inputs (push) or rewarding research outputs (pull).
In all cases, the motivating factor is to promote more investment into translational R&D for neglected
diseases. How they attempt to accomplish this goal, however, varies greatly. It is critical for a global
health entrepreneur to understand how these different incentive structures could impact cash flow.
In this section, I will provide an overview of the various strategies most relevant to a biotech company
focused on neglected disease R&D. With the focus on the small, pre-revenue biotech company,
strategies that focus on either a macroeconomic scale, such as the International Medical R&D Treaty
(22) which proposes a medical R&D "cap and trade" system at the government level, or downstream
delivery of therapeutics or vaccines, such as the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm)
(23), will not be explored.
The reviews of these strategies will touch on the following aspects:
* Overview of how the design works
* Criticisms of the design
* Evaluation of its effectiveness to date
Figure 4: Sample Push and Pull Incentive Schemes for Global Health R&D
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2.1 Push Mechanisms
Push mechanisms attempt to spur investment in R&D by subsidizing research inputs. Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) grants are a well-known form of push financing, designed to help start up
companies de-risk their venture to attract further investment (24). For organizations focusing on a
neglected disease, the subsidy can come in many forms ranging from cash grants to the creation of a
pool of resources with defined access to any or all interested parties. Providing access to these
resources reduces the overall cost of R&D and, depending on the incentive, may also reduce barriers to
entry. What follows is a brief overview of some push mechanisms as applied to neglected disease
research.
3 Image adapted from BIO Ventures for Global Health, "Closing the Health Innovation Gap", 2007
21
Patent Pool Xprie PRV
Foundation Grants PDPs AMC
Pull Mechanisms Pu h
A. Direct Financing - Grants
Direct financing of neglected disease research is the most-straightforward of the push incentives. Cash
grants are awarded from institutions such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Gates
Foundation to successful applicants based on the scientific and technical potential of the proposed
work. These grants are generally directed, meaning the money supplied must be used towards the
proposed research. Most of these awards have gone to academic institutions and national research
authorities for basic research and preclinical activities (25).
The strength of this approach is both in its simplicity and its inherent alignment between donor and
researcher. By selecting the most "fit" proposals for funding, the donor is able to direct research in
ways that seem appropriate to it. This, however, is also one of its main drawbacks. This selection
process necessarily limits the allocations to those that fit the priorities, interests, and beliefs of the
donor, limiting the opportunity for unexpected discoveries. The Gates Foundation has recognized this
as a potential issue and has responded with the Gates Foundation Grand Challenges program, which is
described on the website as "a unique initiative that supports innovative research of unorthodox ideas"
(26). However, even encouraging "unorthodox ideas" introduces a bias into the program that cannot be
overcome, short of funding every single idea.
Given the philanthropic mission of the donor and the desire to mitigate the risk of missing a potentially
novel approach, the trend would be to fund as many programs as possible. This leads to the final
criticism of direct financing of programs. In this scheme, donors will pay for many approaches that do
not ultimately produce technical advancement towards a real solution for the intended disease
indication, leading to an inefficient use of donor funds. Referring again to the Gates Foundation, the
Grand Challenges program recently announced the investment of $100,000 in each of eighty-one
different projects that explore "bold and largely unproven ways to improve health in developing
countries". Four out of the eighty-one awards went to private sector companies (27).
Direct financing is an important mechanism by which resources can be spread across many research
groups. Anyone is welcome to apply to these funds, and there are no barriers to entry. This mechanism
will continue to be important in encouraging early stage, high risk ideas in a non-dilutive manner,
providing access to resources for ideas and approaches that are not yet ready to be put into a market-
based risk/reward paradigm. As an inefficient allocator of donor funds, however, direct financing
should not be extended beyond this perspective4
B. Patent Pooling
The idea behind creating a patent pool, where firms donate rights to owned intellectual property (IP) for
a specified purpose, is to reduce the barriers to entry for research. Gary Pisano, a faculty member at the
Harvard Business School, suggested that a more "open" licensing model for important, upstream
discovery tools and technologies should be made available to more than one company, which he
suggests would spur more innovation in early stage research (28). While his discussion was targeted
towards university patenting practices, the general notion of making important intellectual property
available to a broader audience to reduce the barriers to entry, and thus increase opportunities for
more innovation, applies to neglected disease research as well.
As opposed to the simplicity of granting a cash award, patent pools will have significant contractual
language attached to ensure that the donated property is used only for the specified purposes in certain
4 Direct financing can also play a role in advancing programs that have progressed through the clinic and are ready
for commercialization, which is an efficient use of funds compared to funding early stage research. These funds
are often applied through Product Development Partnerships, a model that will be discussed later in Section of this
chapter, and therefore is not included here.
locations by eligible organizations. Moreover, one would expect that as the number of donors
contributing to a patent pool rises, the level of legal bureaucracy would also increase, thus hindering the
ability of the incentive to deliver on its full promise. If a pool can be created, however, basic research
firms could benefit from having access to a broader set of drug discovery resources at their disposals5 .
In one example, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) recently announced that it would place some of its patents for
chemical libraries, drug candidates, and formulation technologies into a pool (29). The fine print of this
announcement, however, reveals the overhead that comes with a patent pool. The geographic use is
limited to the 50 least developed countries, a license will still have to be purchased for use of the
technology (likely at a discount), and HIV/AIDS was not listed as one of the eligible applications for use.
While still a welcomed gesture on the part of GSK, it is not clear exactly how much benefit is being
provided.
In a modification of the patent pool idea, UNITAID, an NGO that negotiates lower drug prices, has stated
its intent to create a pool that would allow patent donors to license AIDS drugs in return for royalties
(30). This alteration aims to create a financial incentive for donors to contribute to the pool.
Like other push mechanisms, patent pools have promise in helping promote basic research, but the
mechanism alone is not likely to lead to meaningful translational research. In short, the costs of
financing the "valley of death" may (or may not) decrease with the presence of a patent pool.
5 Patent pooling is not a new concept to the private sector. The Open Invention Network in the open source
software industry provides one example. (60)
C. Resource Reallocations
Resource reallocation schemes aim to address the market failure by redirecting assets from private
sector "value" to socially needed goods. One example would be tax credit for neglected disease R&D,
which puts government tax revenue back into the research organization and effectively lowers the cost
of research inputs. This type of tax-credit incentive was enacted as part of the Orphan Drug Act of 1983.
Another example is differential pricing across geographic regions based on ability to pay. By first
charging higher income countries a price premium, pharmaceutical companies are able to recoup their
R&D investments and then can subsequently subsidize pricing in the developing countries (21). This
approach is sometimes referred to as a dual market strategy, and it assumes the presence of both a
developed world application and the successful development and regulatory approval of the
therapeutic. The dual market strategy is particularly attractive to social venture firms that strive to
create value in both financial and social terms, sometimes referred to as double bottom line (DBL) firms.
While attractive financially, it is important to note that the dual market strategy significantly delays
access to medicines for those most in need, reducing the social impact of the developed therapeutic.
An alternative form of differential pricing is royalty redirection, where the originator firm licenses the
developing country rights to a drug on a royalty-free or limited-royalty basis to a partner firm. This
lowers the marginal cost to the developing country re-seller, allowing it to reduce the price of the drug
to the developing country population. Similar to the differential pricing example, this model requires
the presence of a developed world market and does not specifically address the difficulty in obtaining
financing for development of the drug.
Summary of Push Mechanisms
Push mechanisms strive to reduce the cost of research inputs, either through a direct donation of
research funding or an indirect reduction of the cost of the needed resources. While these mechanisms
do help to reduce the barriers to entry of neglected disease R&D, and thus overall risk, they do not
inherently contain any reward incentives to drive new product development to market. Push
mechanisms will therefore be most applicable to firms conducting early stage research that have non-
market based incentives to develop drugs for neglected diseases.
For-profit firms seeking a return also need to reduce risk, and to that extent push mechanisms are
extremely important and valuable. However, the question remains as to whether push mechanisms will
be sufficient to spur private sector investment in neglected disease R&D, or whether complementary
pull mechanisms will also be needed.
2.2 Pull Mechanisms
Pull mechanisms aim to spur investment in R&D by rewarding proven, successful approaches. This
inherently limits payouts to those entities that have met specified criteria, placing a critical importance
on setting realistic, credible metrics upon initiation of the incentive. A commonly recognized pull
incentive is the patent system, where an inventor that creates an innovation that meets certain criteria
(novelty, non-obviousness, reduced to practice, etc.) is rewarded with exclusive rights regarding the use
of the described invention for a specified period of time. Indeed, the patent system has been
foundational in creating the environment in which investment into innovative new therapeutics has
occurred.
In the global health arena, several pull-based initiatives have been specifically designed to encourage
research and development for neglected disease therapeutics, including Advanced Market
Commitments and Priority Review Vouchers.
A. Advanced Market Commitments (AMC)
AMCs are designed to reduce market uncertainties by executing, up front, a set of legally binding
contracts whereby "one or more sponsors would commit to a minimum price to be paid per person
[treated] for an eligible product, up to a certain number of individuals [treated]" (31). By offering a
guaranteed price point for a successful product, and assuming a credible source of this guarantee, the
establishment of these commitments should reduce market uncertainty to the originator firm.
AMCs were constructed specifically to address the time-inconsistency problem described in the
overview. By establishing credible contracts before the R&D investment has been made, participating
firms are able to reduce the risk of donor-induced pricing pressures, thereby reducing overall market
uncertainty. Having these contracts in place "sets" the market and allows firms to base their financial
projections for the project in less uncertain terms.
Each AMC contract will include specifications for product acceptance into the program, known as the
Target Product Profile (TPP), the price that will be guaranteed for an eligible product, and the total
quantity of doses eligible to be purchase at the guaranteed price. Together, the latter two data points
create a minimum market size needed by a private sector firm to evaluate the potential for financial
return. Under the terms of the contract, manufacturers will be required to continue supplying the
product after the AMC subsidy has been exhausted at a pre-specified price point known as the "tail
price".
AMCs are relatively new, and little applied data exists to support or refute their effectiveness in creating
incentives for neglected disease R&D. In February 2007, the first AMC was announced for a
pneumococcal vaccine. A total of $1.5B was committed by five countries in conjunction with the Gates
Foundation, GAVI Alliance and the World Bank (32).
As AMCs are put into practice, contractual variations will undoubtedly exist, including a minimum
guarantee of doses that will be purchased under the program. Details on firm exclusivity will also need
to be specified by defining and describing the eligibility of follow-on products that meet the TPP. These
factors will directly affect how a private sector firm views the risk/reward profile for the opportunity.
For donors, AMCs are attractive in that funds are only disbursed for "successful" projects, offering a
cost-efficient use of donor funds (31). Rather than having the donors select which candidate to fund,
the private sector is motivated to optimally select candidate programs for further investment, likely a
more efficient approach than the "direct financing" pull mechanism described in Section 2.1.A of this
chapter.
B. Priority Review Vouchers (PRV)
Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), a drug candidate application
designated as priority review has a 6 month target date, post-filing, for FDA action versus the standard
review timeline of 10 months (33). This designation was created to expedite the process for drugs that
address significant unmet medical needs. The value of having priority status on an application to any
firm is realized in terms of faster time to market, and by extension, longer market exclusivity for the
product.
Grabowski et al proposed extending this patent-based incentive to neglected diseases by granting a
priority review voucher to firms that successfully develop a new therapeutic that has no developed
world market (34). In 2007, Congress passed an amendment to the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 that created such a voucher, and the PRV incentive program was signed into
law in September, 2008. The initial list of eligible diseases is shown in Table 3. However, the legislation
also includes language to allow granting of a PRV for "Any other infectious disease for which there is
no significant market in developed nations and that disproportionately affects poor and
marginalized populations" (35).
Table 3: Diseases for which a Priority Review Voucher may be granted (35)
Tuberculosis Cholera Fascioliasis Onchocerciasis
Dengue/DengueMalaria Dengue/Dengue Leishmaniasis Schistosomiasishaemorrhagic fever
Dracunculiasis (guinea- Soil transmittedBlinding trachoma Leprosyworm disease) helminthiasis
Human AfricanBuruli Ulcer Lymphatic filariasis Yawstrypa nosomiasis
The PRV can be used on any future new drug application (NDA) at the FDA, regardless of indication. The
value of this voucher to the firm is realized when it is used on a subsequent product that would
otherwise not qualify for priority review at the FDA, thereby reducing time to market and extending the
period of market exclusivity. This voucher can be sold or traded, providing the grantee with a
potentially monetizable asset.
The promise of the PRV incentive is directly tied to the value of the voucher, which is not currently
known. Many estimates have been calculated, ranging from $50M to as high as $600M (36). The vast
range of the estimated value of a PRV is testament to the uncertainty underlying the program, mostly
29
tied to the FDA's ability to deliver on the timelines. These uncertainties go right to the heart of the
incentive, as the value of the reward is directly tied to getting a product to market more quickly by using
the voucher.
There are other potential issues with this mechanism as well. A voucher is granted to firms that get FDA
approval for a new drug for an eligible disease, with "new" being defined as one whose active ingredient
has not previously been approved by the FDA. This opens the door for two unintended consequences.
First, a drug that has been approved outside of the US could simply be registered through the FDA and
awarded a voucher. In fact, this is how the first voucher was received. Novartis had been selling
Coartem TM in other regions but had never previously registered the drug in the US (37). In doing so now,
the company received the first priority review voucher6 . However, no new innovation has been created,
which was certainly not the intent of the program.
The second unintended consequence of the program is that the awarding of the voucher is not
specifically tied to a target product profile specifically designed for developing country applications. A
drug could be approved for a neglected disease, awarded a voucher, and have no practical utility in the
developing world. Conversely, an innovative new formulation of an existing drug that enables
developing world access to the drug goes unrewarded in this program.
As noted previously, the promise of the voucher program is directly tied to the market value of the
voucher itself. Similar to AMCs, there is little data available to discern the effect of the incentive on
spurring R&D for neglected diseases. Indeed, opinions on the potential of the program to truly spur
neglected disease vary widely. Regardless, the vouchers will carry some value, even if the exact figure is
yet to be determined.
6 It should be noted that Novartis' interests in registering the drug in the US, or their previous decision to not
register the drug in the US, may have been independent of the voucher. Nevertheless, they now hold a PRV.
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C. Fast Track Option (FTO)
Moran et al in 2005 proposed a mechanism referred to as a "Fast Track Option" (38). The underlying
value of this incentive is very similar to the PRV in that a new drug application is accelerated through the
regulatory approval process, and a recipient firm is able to sell and/or transfer a portion of this benefit.
The estimated acceleration through the regulatory process is between 6 months and 2 years (38).
There are two primary differences between PRVs and FTOs, both related to the time in which the
applicant engages the FDA. First, "fast track" designation by the FDA constitutes a formal process where
the agency facilitates the development and expedites the review of promising drugs that address life-
threatening conditions (33). This requires more agency participation and interaction with the applicant
relative to PRVs, which would seemingly increase the burden on the already stretched agency. Second,
given that the FDA formally engages in drug development with the firm under fast track designation, an
application is "fast-tracked" much earlier in the process than that for a priority review designation.
Both of these differences would benefit the recipient biotech company by allowing it to monetize the
fast track option much earlier than a PRV. The value of the option would likely be larger than a PRV
given the extended time savings to market as well as the benefit of working directly with the FDA on the
drug development planning process.
Given the uncertainties around the FDA's ability to deliver on the priority review program, the fast track
option has gained very little traction. Under this scheme, these same concerns would be magnified
given the increased participatory requirement of the agency.
Summary of Pull Mechanisms
In contrast to the push mechanisms described previously, the pull mechanisms reward research that has
been completed. The risk under these mechanisms is placed primarily on the shoulders of the private
sector, which will paradoxically impact the size of the requisite reward. Moreover, significant details
and uncertainties around each of the mechanisms described need to be developed and communicated
for the mechanisms to be credibly viewed.
Pull mechanisms could also have another unintended consequence. Big pharma is becoming more
engaged in neglected diseases through public private partnerships (PPP), which Moran et al suggested
provided the "cheapest" way to get neglected diseases through to market (38). If this assertion is
correct, the creation of market-based pull mechanisms could potentially displace the cheaper, goodwill-
based activities of PPPs with higher cost, profit-based incentives of the private sector alone. Under this
scenario, would the higher costs of development be offset by faster time to market? Any answer would
be speculative, but going forward the impact of pull incentives on neglected disease drug development
performance between PPPs and private sector companies should continue to be monitored.
The primary benefit of pull mechanisms remains attractive. Creating market based incentives will likely
increase the overall number of participants interested in investing in neglected disease R&D, thereby
creating fuller pipelines for neglected disease therapeutics.
2.3 Other Resources
A. Prizes: The Push/Pull Hybrid
Prizes date as far back as the 17 th century as an incentive mechanism to spur R&D in targeted areas (39).
The X-prize, likely the best known example of this type of mechanism, was made famous by the Ansari
Prize where teams attempted to create a spacecraft that could carry three people to 100 kilometers
above the earth twice in a two week time span. The reward for achieving this technical milestone was
$10M (40).
The intent behind the X-prize model specifically is to encourage groups to work together to meet a
particular technological milestone, with the cash prize providing the incentive. The barriers to entry in
this model are extremely low (but not zero) to encourage broad participation.
The X-prize Foundation has created some prizes for neglected disease areas, but other groups are also
setting prizes. For example, the Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Association (ALSA) announced a $1M
prize for establishing a biomarker that can be used to halve the costs of clinical trials for ALS. It is split
into two phases, with $15k being given to the first five teams that submit an accepted, theoretical
proposal, and the remaining $925k going to the first team demonstrating that its biomarker meets the
specified criteria (41).
The prize mechanism is potentially attractive as applied to neglected diseases for its dual push/pull
characteristics. On the surface, prizes appear to be most like a pull incentive in that rewards are
allocated only for successful research outputs. While rewarding the outputs, however, the prize model
can also be structured such that the proceeds are directed towards furthering the neglected disease
research, creating a "push-like" alignment of donor incentives with the distribution of those funds.
Combining push with pull in this way greatly reduces the private deadweight loss of push incentive
schemes alone, where donors spread dollars across many research inputs that ultimately yield no
benefit.
It should be noted, however, that some issues inherent to both push and pull mechanisms are also
reflected in the prize model. As noted previously, pull mechanisms require clear contractual language
that must be specified in advance of the research and a credible source behind the reward. Similarly, in
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a prize setting, clearly defined specifications of what constitutes "winning" the prize and a credible
source behind the cash will both be required. To ensure the "push" benefit, i.e. that donor interests are
aligned with the allocation and usage of funds, donors will need to create ways to ensure that the prize
winnings are used towards furthering the goal of the research in the neglected disease indication.
Similar to the push model, prize organizers will also face an inherent tension between wanting to fund
many projects through an interim milestone and not funding ultimately doomed projects. This is
observed in the ALS prize, where the first stage encouraged five teams to submit proposals for a nominal
prize, followed by a final winner take all model. By creating an interim milestone with a $15k prize, the
sponsors limited the diversity of approaches to the problem, but also capped its private deadweight loss
to $60k ($15k for four non-winning teams), reflecting the tension inherent in push mechanisms'.
Other variations of cash prizes have been proposed that would offer rewards to a firm that relinquishes
the rights to a patented innovation that is useful in the neglected disease context (42-45). These
rewards would be disbursed from a centralized, revolving pool. Not surprisingly, proposals vary in who
funds the pool, the size of the rewards, and governance of the scheme. While thought provoking, these
mechanisms do not appear to offer the upfront contractual clarity needed for an effective pull
mechanism. For example, how much clinical efficacy would need to be demonstrated before a reward
might be disbursed? Who would decide if a product qualified for a reward? How much would that
reward offer? Clarity to these questions would minimally be required before a decision to pursue the
prize would be warranted.
For the neglected disease biotech company, the prize model becomes very interesting because of the
timing of the cash prize. If prizes are created that reward meeting a preclinical or early stage
developmental milestone, the winnings could directly assist in funding the next stage of development
7 Given that each of the four non-winning teams may have spent more than $15k competing for the final prize,
society's deadweight loss may not have been capped at $60k.
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for the therapeutic (not to mention positive press). In contrast to AMCs and PRVs, the cash is made
available to the technological "leader" during the time that it is most needed, i.e. during the valley of
death.
B. Public-Private Partnerships and Product Development Partnerships (PDP)
The term public-private partnership (PPP) encapsulates several types of collaboration among public,
philanthropic, academic, and private sector entities. In the global health context, PPPs generally act as
formal hubs for collaboration. PPPs focused on drug development are referred to as product
development partnerships (PDPs); examples include the TB Alliance, International AIDS Vaccine Initiative
(IAVI), and Medicines for Malaria Ventures (MMV) just to name a few. Many of these organizations are
portfolio managers of research, partnering with private and public sector organizations to further the
development of a therapeutic program. Through their network of partners, these PDPs act as a resource
clearinghouse for organizations working in the specified disease area. Resources may include direct
funding, access to know-how, or rights to an enabling technology.
Potential therapeutic candidates that are in-licensed or acquired are co-developed and financed by the
PDP via an outsourcing model, using academic labs, contract research organizations (CROs), and big
pharma companies as the development partners (see Figure 5). Importantly, CROs have vertically
integrated beyond clinical trial management over the past decade, and the CRO industry now offers
services from discovery through registration. This additional drug development capacity has facilitated
the evolution of the virtual drug development model of the PDPs (as well as for-profit ventures).
The duration of the co-development engagement varies by PDP, but several are "fully integrated" in that
they stay actively engaged in the development of the drug through and until the drug is on the market
and being delivered to patients.
Figure 5: PPPs as Resource Allocators (38)
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Many of these PDPs however, are vertically focused on one disease indication, such as TB or malaria.
Given that certain biological targets could have therapeutic applicability across several disease areas
(see Figure 6), this vertical approach may not optimize drug discovery efforts across the broader
neglected disease portfolio.
Figure 6: Targets are transferable across diseases (46) TB=Tuberculosis, HAT=Human African Trypanosomiasis
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Nonetheless, PDPs have been successful in filling an important, clinical development gap for neglected
diseases. In 2005 they accounted for 75% of the neglected disease pipeline (38). PDPs also offer
pharmaceutical companies an outsourcing option to continue development of a potentially useful
therapeutic, even if there is little to no profit incentive to the originator.
2.4 Summary of Market Design Mechanisms
As noted in the introduction to this section, all of the mechanisms described herein aim to spur more
funding in neglected disease research and development. The base incentives behind that aim vary
greatly, illustrated at a high level by the noted characteristic differences between push and pull
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mechanisms. For the global health entrepreneur, understanding these differences - and taking
advantage of them when possible - can affect the financial prospects of the company either by reducing
the risk of the venture and/or increasing the potential reward.
Push, pull, and hybrids can each be effective in stimulating investment. Combinations of incentives may
be needed to attract the level of private sector investment desired by the global health community (38).
However, it should also be noted that the private sector is not homogenous, and not all incentive
schemes will attract the same types of companies. For example, the value of a PRV or an AMC to a pre-
revenue biotech firm is only realized if the incentives attract investment; otherwise these pull
mechanisms are meaningless as the company will not have sufficient cash to pursue the project. By
contrast, a large pharmaceutical company may have massive stores of working capital that could be
applied towards earning one of these rewards.
With the focus of this thesis centered on the global health entrepreneur, in the next section I will
explore the question of if/how these mechanisms affect the pre-revenue biotech company.
Chapter 3: Research and Findings
3.1 Overview
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the potential benefits of various market design mechanisms to an
early stage biotech company and to characterize the incentives it faces. My hypothesis entering this
research is that a combination of market design mechanisms and incentives can make a neglected
disease therapeutic financially viable for a company on an NPV basis. However, the levels of these
incentives either will not be supported by market prices (PRVs) or will not be tolerable to donors (AMC
pricing). Finally, given that venture capital dollars have not flowed into starting neglected disease
focused biotech companies, I suspect that the returns generated by market-based estimates on the
value of PRVs will not be sufficient to generate venture capital interest.
For any young startup, a constant focus must be placed on cash flow, both for cash on hand as well as
cash needed to finance future operations. This is especially critical for an early stage biotech company
that has no projected revenue stream for the upcoming 3 to 5 years.
I therefore started this research by constructing a skeleton "base case" working model representing the
cash flows of a biotech firm. From this base case model, I added incentive schemes independently and
in combination to create various scenarios. I then analyzed the results using net present value (NPV) as
a proxy for the perspective of the biotech company. Investors, donors, and society represent important
stakeholders to the biotech firm, and as such metrics including IRR, venture multiples, and price of the
therapeutic needed to support a for-profit business were also captured as a partial representation of
these interests.
Each biotech business is unique, and there are many, many inputs needed to calculate a net present
value (NPV) for a project. This model does not (and cannot) accurately portray data for any particular
company and as such, a project-specific analysis would need to be done for any given company. With
that said, I will use "industry standard" inputs whenever possible.
The construction of any model such as this incorporates many assumptions. While these assumptions
are applied uniformly to the base case, it must be noted that the results derived from this model are a
product of the assumptions built into the model. As such, the focus of the reader should be on the
relative impacts of the incentive mechanisms more so than on the absolute values of the simulation
outputs. Those elements particularly sensitive to underlying assumptions will be noted, and sensitivity
analyses focused on them will be performed.
For this research, I also conducted a small survey of industry representatives. The motivations of this
survey were twofold, 1) to pressure test certain variables in the model, such as the potential value of a
priority review voucher, and 2) to understand non-monetary implications of some of these mechanisms
from an industry perspective. These surveys were not designed to be statistically meaningful in any
quantitative way, and as such will be referenced in Chapter 4.
3.2 Base Case Assumptions for Private Sector Biotech Company
To display the impact of the incentive schemes on a private sector biotech company considering a
neglected disease therapeutic program, I created a base case using inputs for drug development,
financing of the business, market data, and company valuation. These inputs were selected based on
their collective representation of a hypothetical company facing the proverbial "valley of death" funding
gap described previously.
A. Drug Development Inputs
To model the drug development process, I used inputs from two sources - the 2004 DiMasi et al report
on drug development by therapeutic area (47) and the Barrett report on anti-infective drug
development (48). These data were specific for anti-infective drug development, offering the best
representation of most global health drug development projects.
Table 4: Drug Development Inputs
Conditional Time
Probability of Launch (years)
Preclinical 4.8% 10.0% 6
Phase I 12.1% 24.9% 5
Phase 11 10.6% 37.7% 4
Phase III 72.5% 65.2% 3
Registration $2M 95.0% 1
%Spend
To allow for the variation in total capital required, the spend data reflect the percentage allocated to the
particular stage of development. These percentages were taken from the 2004 DiMasi et al report on
drug development costs by therapeutic area and represent the anti-infectives class of drugs (47). As
noted in that publication, the relatively high percentage spent on Phase III trials is likely a reflection of
the high costs associated with performing HIV vaccine trials and may not accurately reflect other
indications. However, given that I am using these data as percentages of total spend and not absolute
spend, any anomaly will be applied uniformly across the scenarios.
Registration costs that incorporate PDUFA and related fees are fixed at $2M for all scenarios (49).
Probability of Launch
These inputs represent the conditional probability of the drug getting to market from the given stage.
For example, a drug candidate at the start of a Phase II clinical trial has a 37.7% chance of progressing all
the way to market. These data were also pulled from DiMasi et al report (47) and are also specific to
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anti-infectives. In the model, these probabilities are used to place risk adjustments on all future cash
flows.
Time Points
Similar to the probability data, these inputs represent the number of years to launch from the start of a
given stage; the data were adapted from the Barrett report on anti-infective drug development (48).
B. Financing Inputs
Total Capital Required
One of the key variables in evaluating any therapeutic program is the total capital required to move the
candidate through to market. As a baseline, I used the reported and projected out-of-pocket R&D costs
for the tuberculosis drug PA-824, a new chemical entity that is being developed by the TB Alliance, a
product development partnership. Moran et al reported preclinical costs for this program to be $4.5M,
and total clinical costs to the end of phase III to be approximately $86M. Moran also reported industry
estimates of $100-150M for the clinical trial costs of a malaria drug (38). DiMasi suggested a total cost
of $189M for an anti-infective program, but noted that this figure is driven in large part by HIV costs and
long Phase III trials (Figure 7).
Based on these estimates, I conduct alternative analyses based on total out-of-pocket capital
requirements of $50M, $100M, and $150M, with the base case set at $50M.
Figure 7: Clinical Stage R&D Costs by Therapeutic Area (47)
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Capital Raised
In the base case of the model, all capital raised to finance development comes in the form of equity.
The model assumes no partnerships, and all cash raised is dilutive. The model sets a minimum cash
balance of $2M. Falling below this level triggers the subsequent equity financing round. By doing this,
the ability to evaluate the time value impact of an incentive scheme on cash flows is incorporated.
To model the potential returns of the biotech company to a venture capitalist, a capitalization table was
created with a maximum of four rounds of investment. For simplicity, the step-ups in valuation between
rounds were held constant at 25%, i.e. the valuation of the biotech company increased by 25% between
the end of the first equity financing and the beginning of the second equity financing. Incorporating this
step-up allows for differences between investment rounds to be observed, and the increased liquidity
risk of the early stage investor relative to the later stage investor is therefore captured. The down-
round scenario, where the valuation of the company decreases between rounds, was not incorporated
into any scenarios. Given that down rounds are financially detrimental to investors, it is reasonable to
assume that no venture capitalist would make an investment in a company where they expect a future
down round will occur.
All equity rounds were divided evenly between investors with respect to capital allocated, and all
investors were assumed to participate in all subsequent rounds. While this may not reflect the real
world per se, it does allow for a high level analysis of the early stage investor, the critical time point in
this analysis. An IRR calculation was also created and reported to reflect the length of time of the
investment for the earliest stage investor.
The "capital raised" inputs were set to meet the financing needs of the biotech company going forward,
and allow for the effects of the various incentives schemes from a baseline case.
C. Market Inputs
To create a profile for a global health biotech company, I modeled market data for a potential
schistosomiasis therapeutic vaccine. This choice was made both because some data describing the
market are available8 and the market for a product in this indication has no significant developed world
application.
Pricing
Moran et al noted that Vansil is priced at $20.16 per adult treatment, which is far too expensive for
most countries (38)9. In many scenarios evaluated in this model, this value will be used as the price of
the schistosomiasis therapeutic vaccine.
8 The total prevalence of schistosomiasis is 207M worldwide with over 80% of cases occurring in sub-Saharan
Africa. (4; 6)
9 It should be noted that praziquantel is currently administered to schistosomiasis patients at a cost of $.20-.30 per
treatment (61). While effective, a therapeutic vaccine that is longer lasting is still needed. (62)
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Production Costs
Based on the price listed above, I used a gross margin of 50% to estimate the cost of production (50).
This estimate directly affects the free cash flows to the company post launch. For simplicity
manufacturing costs are assumed to be incurred at the time of launch. Scale-up timing and costs
between small molecule products, biologics, and vaccines can vary significantly, and as such a sensitivity
analysis on this variable is included.
Quantity Sold
Between 2002-2007, the Schistosomiasis Control Initiative and the Gates Foundation coordinated to
deliver 40 million schistosomiasis treatments. Using these data, I have assumed a linear average of 8
million treatments per year that could be delivered, thereby setting the market quantity (51). Sales are
assumed to ramp up to peak by year four, allowing for production ramp up over the same time period.
In "traditional" biotech firms, the ramp to peak sales for an anti-infective takes closer to six years (52),
but I am assuming here that established delivery channels, e.g. SCI-Gates, will be able to continue at the
same rate going forward as they did from 2002-2007, namely at a rate of 8 million treatments per year.
Given the importance of this variable, a sensitivity analysis for quantity sold is shown in the results.
D. Company Valuation Inputs
To value the biotech company, a risk adjusted, net present value method was used based on free cash
flows to the firm with the following considerations:
Cost of capital: The cost of capital for a large pharmaceutical company or large biotech company has
been highly characterized in the literature (53; 54; 38). Given the lengthy timelines for clinical
development and the changing risk profile of a project as it progresses through clinical milestones, it is
critical to capture this changing risk profile in the discount rate. In this model, I have chosen to use the
risk adjusted NPV method with a constant cost of capital. A staircase model of cost of capital could also
have been utilized, but using the risk adjusted NVP allowed for a more straightforward view of the
impact of cost of capital on the value of the various incentives to the model company.
When valuing the biotech company in the context of a potential acquisition, a real cost of capital of 11%
was used for the acquiring firm, the approximate mean of the real cost of capital between 1985-2000
(see Figure 8).
For biotech firms, the cost of capital tends to be higher reflecting the increased risk of the business.
Similarly constructed models have used 25% for the cost of capital(55), and this same value was used
here.
Figure 8: Cost of capital data for the pharmaceutical industry (54)
Nominal and real cost-of-capital (COC) for the phamaceutical industry. 1985-2000
1985 1990 1994 2000
Nommal COC (%)A 16.1 15.1 14.2 15.0
Inflation rate (%)b 5.4 4.5 3.1 3.1
Real COC (%) 10.8 10.6 11.1 11.9
SThe nominal values for 1985 and 1990 are based on Myers and Shyam-Sunder (1996). The nominal value
for 1994 is taken from Myers and Howe (1997). The 2000 nominal value is based on our own computations using
comparable samples and data sources.
b The inlation rate for 1985 is taken from Myers and Howe (1997). the rate for 1990 is a 5-year average
centered on January 1990 and is based on the CPI-U. the rate for 1994 and 2000 is the long-term inflation rate
from 1926 to 2000 (Ibbotson Associates. 2001. p. 17).
Enterprise Value: Given that the model assumes an all equity firm, cash balance can approximate the
enterprise value of the firm, allocating no strategic value to the acquirer for the underlying assets of the
global health biotech company.
Acquisition Value: The acquisition value is calculated as the sum of the time adjusted NPV of free cash
flows to the firm plus enterprise value as defined above. It is an approximation of the value of the
biotech firm to an acquirer. As such, the cost of capital for the acquiring firm is used to discount future
cash flows from the time of acquisition, which for this research was set to be at the time of launch for
the therapeutic candidate.
Time Horizon: For purposes of this analysis, free cash flows are modeled out seven years post-launch
(see Chapter 3, Section A, Drug Development Inputs for years to launch). This time horizon incorporates
a four-year, linear ramp to peak sales (see Chapter 3, Section C, Market Data). Terminating all cash
flows at seven years post-launch represents complete market share erosion through either generic
competition or, in the case of an AMC, depletion of the price subsidy after which the tail price of the
contract would offer marginal cost or cost-plus pricing.
Free Cash Flows: Free cash flows, by convention, should adjust for changes in depreciation, working
capital, interest, and taxes. It would be impossible to portray the capital expenditures of all companies
in a generalizable manner, and as such, changes to depreciation and working capital have not been
included in this model. Interest was not factored into free cash flows, given that all financing in the
model is either in the form of equity or non-interest bearing sources of cash such as a grant. Taxes were
modeled to reflect tax loss carry-forward, and the tax rate was set at 35% (50).
E. Sensitivity Analyses for Inputs
The impacts of these assumptions are not trivial, and it is worth reminding the reader of their import
when evaluating the results. With that said, I have tried to set these inputs in such a way that
adjustments would work to the benefit of the biotech company and/or the investor, e.g. the availability
of debt to the company would reduce the overall need for dilutive financing as well as reduce the cost of
capital. In instances when an assumption could alter results and interpretations significantly, I will
perform a sensitivity analysis.
F. Incentive Schemes
For each of the subsequent scenarios, I included one or more of the following incentive schemes:
* Cash grant of $5M or $10M, awarded in Year 1
* Prize in Year 3, intended to represent a Proof of Concept clinical milestone of either $5M or
$10M. Note: This value does not represent the realized total prize, but rather the expected
value of a prize to the company. For example, assuming a total prize of $25M with 5 entrants,
the expected value of winning the prize to the company would be $5M. Similarly, the $10M
value would represent the expected value of a $50M prize with 5 entrants10
* Priority Review Voucher valuations of $25M, $50M, $100M, $200M, or $400M
* Advanced Market Commitment that sets a price at $5, $10, or $15 per treatment for 100 million
treatments, representing total market size of $500M, $1B, and $1.5B respectively.
These variables were chosen to encapsulate estimates of the size and/or benefit of any particular
incentive scheme. For example, estimated values for PRVs are shown in Figure 9.
10 Modeling the expected value of the prize effectively "risk-adjusts" the prize similar to the way clinical trial
phases are risk adjusted. The risk-adjustment for the prize is 1/5, or 20%.
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Figure 9: Estimates of the Value of PRVs (36)
Metrics for setting the market for priority review vouchers
$S2 106 Four monts df Lftor sales in the US
$775 MI M Increase in tly market cap due to Prioity Review designation for Eant
750 MIBM Decine in Lily market cap due to extension of Eflt review
$SWSnoUS *Jn Estimated value of voucher, according to industry officials cited by FDA
StIg.S2 M n Estimated value of voucher, according to industry sources intervewed byThe WM Repor
G. Simulation Metrics
Outputs of the simulation were chosen to reflect the perspectives of various stakeholders, including the
following:
* Net Present Value (NPV) represents the interests of the biotech company under the assumption
that the project must have a positive NPV. In several cases in the scenarios, NPV will be set to
zero to represent the minimum set of incentives needed to make such a project financially
feasible to the company.
* VC Multiple, Series A IRR, Series B IRR are metrics used to measure venture capital returns.
* Acquisition Value at Launch is, as previously defined in Section D of this chapter, the price an
acquiring company would be willing to pay for the modeled biotech company. This value is the
numerator for the VC Multiple.
* Price/Treatment is the price point that defines the market size (with quantity fixed) needed to
support a for-profit company. This can be considered a proxy for donor perspective under the
assumption that price subsidies will be needed for most any neglected disease therapeutic. As
such, price can be considered to be the AMC price.
3.3 Limitations of the model
Every model, by definition, requires some level of abstraction and generalization. The primary
generalization, and thus limitation, of the model developed for this work is the inability to capture the
specific capital needs of any company undertaking a neglected disease therapeutic project. To mitigate
this, as part of the research PRV valuations and total capital requirements were modeled across ranges
of values. A sensitivity analysis was also performed for inputs having the most inherent variation,
namely cost of capital, gross margin as a measure of production costs, and quantity sold. Finally, the
remaining input values were chosen such that increases would either improve or not materially change
the financial prospects of the biotech company. For example, the time horizon was set at the preclinical
stage. Setting the time point further downstream would not impact the NPV of the project to the
biotech company, but would positively impact the investor IRR.
For many scenarios presented, an acquisition value is reported which explicitly suggests that
pharmaceutical companies would be interested in purchasing a biotech company focused on a
neglected disease indication. This may or may not be true, and historical evidence would certainly
suggest skepticism. However, modeling an exit allows for insight into the level of incentives needed for
such an event to occur.
While useful for the model, the output metrics as defined do not completely or necessarily represent
the best interests of society. For example, by assuming that a project with an NPV of zero is "neutral" to
the company, I am implicitly assuming that no other higher NPV project opportunity exists for the
company. The same principle holds true for the investor metrics. Finally, the social value of developing
a therapeutic for a neglected disease is not captured in this model. In fact, by setting NPV to zero in
many of the scenarios I am implicitly attributing social value as the impetus for the company to
undertake the research effort. While these metrics are not perfect, they will be useful to answer the
question of how the incentives for neglected disease drug development impact the small biotech firm,
the underlying motive behind this research.
3.4 Scenario Analyses
The scenarios were designed to address the following questions:
* How does each of the mechanisms independently affect the base case?
* Which is "better" for the biotech company - an equal amount of a prize, a grant, or a PRV?
* What is the "break even" price point to the biotech company for each incentive with respect to
price?
* What is the "break even" price point to the biotech company for each incentive that will support
a 5x multiple for a venture investor?
* Given set pricing (AMC), approximately how large would a PRV have to be to allow for a
breakeven NPV to the biotech company?
* How does the analysis change with an increase in total capital required?
* Adding in all incentive schemes, what is maximum total capital required that will allow for a
breakeven NPV for the biotech company?
* How does the incentive picture compare between the small biotech and Big Pharma?
A. How does each of the mechanisms independently affect the base case?
Scenario #1: Price=$20.16, Measure Return to Investors and NPV of Company
To begin the analysis, I set the price for the drug at $20.16, equal to the price charged for Vansil,
another schistosomiasis drug. By holding this value constant, I could subsequently measure the effects
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of the incentive schemes on the NPV to the company, the acquisition value, venture multiple, and IRR
for the early stage investor. (Note that this scenario could be viewed as setting an AMC price at $20.16)
Figure 10: Push Mechanisms vs. NPV/Returns
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Figure 11: Prizes vs. NPV/Returns
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Figure 12: PRV Valuations vs. NPV/Returns
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Observations:
* The base case has a slightly negative NPV, even at a price point of $20.16, under the
assumptions of the model.
* Push mechanisms, i.e. cash grants, do not affect the NPV of the project (NPV is not directly
impacted by the source of capital financing). The investors, on the other hand, benefit in the
form of higher IRR and a higher multiple, a reflection of the fact that less equity is needed to
achieve the same exit valuation and that the equity funds are raised closer to the time of exit,
delayed by the presence of the up-front cash grants.
* Prizes had a much greater effect on the NPV of the project, reflecting the later stage timing of
the prize in the cash flow stream, i.e. the prize is applied to a more de-risked project versus the
base case, and therefore the risk adjusted NPV improves. Similar to the cash grant, the IRR for
investors improves slightly reflecting the delayed capital raise. Prizes and cash grants had
similar effects for the investors.
* Vouchers had, by far, the greatest individual effect on NPV, venture multiples and
corresponding IRRs. This is not surprising given the magnitude of variation in the valuation of
the PRV.
B. Which is "better"for the biotech company - an equal amount of a prize, a grant, or a PRV?
Scenario 2: $25M Cash vs. $25M Prize vs. $25M PRV
Given the variable valuations of these mechanisms, I set the value of each incentive to $25M and
compared the same outputs as in Scenario 1.
Figure 13: Comparison of Push, Prize, PRV
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Observations:
This shows the importance to the company of the relationship between risk and the timing of
the incentive payment. While the push mechanism of $25M in cash dramatically helps the
investor via delayed capital raise (as noted earlier), the timing of the prize after completion of
the Phase I trial increases the NPV of the project, starkly showing the impact of applying the
prize dollars to a more de-risked project.
* The value of a PRV needed to raise the NPV from $-0.46 (base case) to the NPV of $2.28M from
the prize scenario, is $158M (data not shown).
C. What is the "break even" price point to the biotech companyfor each incentive with
respect to price?
Scenario 3: NPV=0: Project Breakeven Point
By setting the NPV=O, I evaluated the impact of each of the mechanisms on the price required to
support the project. This perspective could be viewed as a partial proxy for the global health community
and/or a reference to the minimum price for the AMC. While having the NPV set to zero is not optimal
for the biotech company per se, it does serve to illustrate the minimum pricing threshold needed for any
given incentive structure.
Figure 14: Price/Treatment vs. Investor Returns
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Observations:
* As observed previously, the push mechanism provides a bump to the venture returns, stemming
from the non-dilutive grant and the shortened time to exit. Given that NPV is not affected by
the cash grant, price per treatment needed to support an NPV of zero is also not affected.
* The prize model does, however, slightly reduce the price per treatment variable as NPV to the
project is increased with the addition of the prize payment.
* The increasing value of the PRV allows for a precipitous drop in price required to break even, but
venture returns also fall due to the decreased future revenue stream depressing acquisition
value".
D. What is the "break even" price point to the biotech company for each incentive that will
support a 5x multiple for a venture investor?
Scenario 4: Set VC Multiple = 5x
As referenced in the introduction, venture capitalists aim for a minimum of 5x on any investment. This
is especially true for early stage investors. As such, I set the venture multiple in the model to 5x for the
Series A investor to determine the level of incentive mechanisms required to meet this hurdle.
11 Scenario 5 will explore the relationship between PRV, AMC price, and venture returns more closely.
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Figure 15: Venture Returns vs. Price/NPV
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Observations:
* The increasing value of the PRV allows for a significant price drop required to support a 5x
return12. However, even with a large PRV valuation, the price per dose was still $8.56. At the
risk of false precision given the assumptions in the model, this price point is still likely far too
high to suffice for most developing countries.
13
* If PRV valuations are below approximately $150M, the AMC price will have to be $15 or higher
for a venture capitalist to achieve a 5x return.
* It may be counterintuitive at first glance that NPV decreases with the addition of cash grants.
This is an artifact of holding the venture return constant at 5x, as the presence of the cash grant
would otherwise raise the venture multiple to the investor as seen in previous scenarios.
12 Venture multiple was kept constant at 5x for the Series A investor which also yielded a constant 4x return for the
Series B investor.
13 Scenario 7 will explore the AMC price and investor return that results from "all incentives in".
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E. Given set pricing (AMC), approximately how large would a PRV have to be to allow for a
breakeven NPV to the company?
Scenario 5: Adjust PRV to achieve NPV=0
Similar to Scenario 3, I wanted to evaluate the approximate valuation of the PRV needed to support
various levels of pricing (again, similar to an AMC price). For pricing levels of $5, $10, and $15, the NPV
of the firm was set to zero and PRV valuation was measured. Cash grants and prizes were included as
combination scenarios.
Figure 16: Breakeven PRV Valuations vs. Price
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Observations:
As observed previously, the push mechanism does not impact the final PRV valuation needed to
get the project to breakeven, i.e. NPV=O. As such, push and prize in combination do not affect
the PRV valuation needed any more than prize alone.
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* In the price=$5 scenario, the acquisition value is less than the value of the PRV, indicating that
the biotech company's future cash flows are negative, an unsustainable business.
* The effects of the prizes and price changes on PRV valuations are summarized in the following
table:
Table 5: Reduction in PRV value from variations in Price, Prize (vs. Base Case)
Price Base 5M Prize 10M Prize
$5 -- $384M 10% $347M 19% $310M
$10 33% $256M 43% $219M 53% $182M
$15 63% $142M 73% $105M 82% $68M
The price of the AMC clearly impacts the PRV valuation needed in a much greater fashion than the prize.
This is not surprising as any change in the AMC price is applied to 8 million treatments per year in this
model, resulting in an increase of $40M in revenues per year 14, a substantially larger impact than adding
in a $5M or $10M prize even when factoring in the revenues on a discounted, risk-adjusted basis.
Also, the benefits of the prize with respect to PRV value reduction are consistent on a percentage basis
across price points. For example, the 10% reduction "benefit" from the $5M prize is realized uniformly
over the base case scenario for all three price points.
This same analysis could have been performed by keeping the value of the PRV constant and showing
the impacts on NPV to the firm. However, given the current ambiguity in the market on the value of the
14 (Price per treatment increase by $5) x (8M treatments) = $40M additional revenues per year
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PRV, this method seemed more relevant at this time. Moreover, one can safely assume that higher
valuations of a PRV will increase NPV to the project as shown in Scenario 1.
F. How does the analysis change with an increase in total capital required?
Scenario 6: Compare NPV for $50M, $100M. $150M capital required with incentive schemes
(similar to Scenario 1)
Figure 17: NPV/Returns vs. Total Capital Required
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Given the output above, and the uncertainties of the valuation of PRVs, I calculated the breakeven point
(NPV=O) for each of the "total capital required" scenarios. As a reminder, the price was held constant at
$20.16 for direct comparison with the chart from Scenario 1. The minimum PRVs are shown in Table 6
below:
Table 6: Total Capital Required vs. Minimum PRV Valuations
Total Capital Required Min PRV value Min PRV Value with 10M Prize
$50M (Base Case) $24M ($44M)
$100M $377M $303M
$150M $730M $656M
Observations:
Total capital required had a dramatic impact on the PRV valuation needed to break even. Given the
inputs in this model and industry estimates of PRV valuations, no project requiring more than $100M
could be considered viable in a for-profit enterprise, even at a price point of $20.16. This finding led to
the next scenario.
G. Adding in all incentive schemes, what is maximum total capital required that will allow
for a breakeven NPV for the biotech company?
Scenario 7: Incorporate all incentive schemes, optimize fundraising schedule, and find the
maximum total capital required for NPV=0
Building on Section F of this chapter, I next explored the NPV-constrained breakeven point for Total
Capital Expenditures, using the maximum values for the incentive schemes employed in the previous
scenarios and varying PRV by increments of $100M. Those inputs were as follows:
* AMC=$15/treatment
* PRV=$100m, $200M, $300M, $400M
* Prize=$10M
* Grant=$10M
Figure 18: Total Capital Required vs. PRV Valuation
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Observations:
Using these inputs and adjusting the capital raise schedule, the capital limits that produced an NPV=O
increased by approximately $14-15M per $100M increase in PRV valuation. As shown in Section F of this
chapter, any project requiring more than $100M of capital to get to market will not be financially viable
for the biotech company, even when all of the incentive programs are included.
Given the timing of the cash flows, these scenarios all yielded a greater than a 7x return for the Series A
investor with an IRR of over 74% (2 years to launch and putative exit), and a 5.5x return and 137% IRR
for the Series B investor. As observed previously in this thesis, these investor return data are heavily
influenced by the later stage investment profile, which itself is a reflection of the high costs of Phase III
trials relative to Phase I and Phase II trials in the model.
H. How does the incentive picture compare between the small biotech and Big Pharma?
Scenario 8: Set cost of capital = 11% and evaluate the minimum PRV needed to support an NPV=0
project, varying AMC price.
Figure 19: PRV vs. AMC for Pharma, Biotech
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Observations:
This scenario clearly shows how the incentives might influence biotech and pharma differently. At
$50M capital required, the biotech company modeled herein needs both a high PRV valuation and a
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strong, donor-supported AMC contract to be NPV-neutral. By contrast, the pharma company could be
NPV-neutral with either an AMC of $12.72 and no PRV, or a PRV of $91M at a $10 AMC price point.
I. Sensitivity Analysis
For each sensitivity analysis, the price was held constant at $20.16 for comparison with Scenario 1. For
each variable included in the analysis, simulation data will be shown for the variable against NPV of the
project and minimum PRV valuations at base case and with a 10M prize.
Cost of Capital
Figure 20: Sensitivity Analysis, Cost of Capital
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Table 7: Minimum PRV Values vs. Cost of Capital
Cost of Capital Min PRV value Min PRV Value with 10M Prize
11% ($231M) ($275M)
20% ($60M) ($117M)
25%* $24M ($44M)
30% $115M $31M
*Base Case
Observations:
Including the pharmaceutical cost of capital data (11%) and showing the PRV valuation needed to obtain
a breakeven project starkly highlights the importance of this variable in assessing the viability of a
project to a company. Note that while a cost of capital of 11% was used to represent pharma, the cost
of capital for a neglected disease project for a pharma company may be slightly higher than 11% given
increased market risks (delivery, forecasting) and/or technical risk. Nevertheless, the adjusted cost of
capital would not be considerably higher than 11%, and the general finding that cost of capital has a
significant impact on the value of the incentive to pharma vs. biotech holds.
Gross Margin
Figure 21: Sensitivity Analysis, Gross Margins
Table 8: Minimum PRV Values vs. Gross Margins
Gross Margin Min PRV value Min PRV Value with 10M Prize
40% $54M ($16M)
50%* $24M ($44M)
60% ($1M) ($68M)
*Base Case
Observations: As PRV values rise and the value of the company becomes more highly defined by the
incentive event, the impacts of the gross margin variable diminish.
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Figure 22: Sensitivity Analysis, Quantity Sold
Table 9: Minimum PRV Values vs. Quantity Sold
Quantity Sold Min PRV value Min PRV Value with 10M Prize
6M $139M $65M
8M* $24M ($44M)
10M ($79M) ($143M)
*Base Case
Observations:
Quantity sold, which the AMC incentive helps to define, also has a very important effect on the NPV of
the neglected disease project to the company. This variable will change greatly for any given
therapeutic program, and establishing credibility behind the quantities that can be sold through the
program will be important. This sensitivity analysis for quantity sold also underscores the importance to
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both the biotech company and a potential investor of having accurate forecasting data and available
drug delivery channels.
Chapter 4: Analysis and Discussion
4.1 Summary
The objective of this research was to provide early stage, pre-revenue biotech companies focused on
neglected disease R&D with insight into the incentive schemes and market design mechanisms that have
been proposed. I have done this by characterizing the potential impacts on the biotech company and its
stakeholders. The question that must now be asked is, are these incentives sufficient to attract an
investment for a for-profit company going after a global health indication with no developed world
market?
As the simulation data show, no single mechanism is likely to provide sufficient incentive to spur venture
investment, given the industry estimated values of those incentives. The uncertainties underlying the
larger pull mechanisms also make it difficult to predict if combinations of incentives will ultimately spur
more neglected disease research. Given the results of this research, I believe other mechanisms will
likely be necessary, particularly for small biotech companies.
Push Incentives
Push incentives, grants and other forms of up-front, non-dilutive cash offer straightforward benefits to
neglected disease biotech companies. The benefits of this financing to the entrepreneur come in two
forms. As shown in Scenario 1 in Chapter 3, delaying the need for equity financing ultimately improves
the multiple and IRR projections for an investor, which should help ultimately attract investment when
the need arises (ceteris paribus). Funding the company through to a later stage milestone de-risks the
project in the investor's eyes, both in terms of clinical risk and time horizon. Second, and not shown in
the simulation data, are the equity benefits to the entrepreneur. Using NPV to represent the
perspective of the entrepreneur masks its equity ownership interests. As should be intuitively obvious
to any experienced entrepreneur, push mechanisms should be pursued and utilized as much as possible.
For donors, the question of how to apply cash grants in efficient ways will continue to be challenging.
What this research has shown, however, is that when these grants are applied can have important
effects for the biotech company and its investors. Utilizing cash grants in concert with interim pull
mechanisms, such as the prize model, allows for funds to be more specifically applied to projects that
are likely to have a higher social return.
Prizes
The prize model offers an interesting set of benefits to both donors and biotech companies. Proceeds
from a prize can delay the need for equity financing, offering similar benefits as the push mechanisms
described above. The timing of the prize, in Year 3 as modeled, improves the NPV of the project by
applying the proceeds downstream of risk 5s . The prizes are ultimately a competition, and the money is
therefore not guaranteed. As such, the company needs to carefully evaluate its potential for winning
the prize as well as the costs associated with going after the prize.
Given the usual sizes of the awards, the prize structure is well suited for small biotech firms. Moreover,
large pharmaceutical companies would likely not enter such competitions, not wanting to risk publicly
"losing" a competition for a relatively small reward.
1s A cash grant of equal value applied in Year 3 would yield the exact same benefit, but most grants are allocated
for basic, early stage research and not clinical development.
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AMCs
In one form or another, pricing will need to be supported for the neglected disease indication. AMCs
were designed for this purpose, and there is hope that this mechanism will reduce market risk to the
company. Since prices are set up front in an AMC model, price per treatment was mostly used as the
changing exogenous variable. Nevertheless, the importance of price support on the value of the
company is unmistakable and was most clearly illustrated in Table 5, where incremental increases in the
AMC price point had dramatic effects on the valuation of the PRV needed to support a breakeven NPV.
PRVs
PRVs offer intriguing potential as a pull mechanism. Well designed from an economic perspective, PRVs
contribute very little in terms of waste 6 . Aside from the potential scenario where a redeemed voucher
delays an FDA review of another important therapeutic, PRVs appear to offer great potential to society
in terms of addressing the market failures.
However, they are the least characterized with respect to valuation, hence their inclusion as a wide-
ranging exogenous variable in most of the scenarios. As shown in Scenario 6, the needed PRV for our
modeled biotech firm at $100M total capital was $377M (no prize). Given the industry approximations
in Figure 9, this valuation isn't entirely out of the question. However, establishing such a price will not
be easy.
16 Some have proposed simply extending the US patent life of a neglected disease therapeutic by six months rather
than offer a PRV. By doing so, however, the consumer would effectively be subsidizing the returns to the investor
rather than in the PRV model where no such subsidy takes place.
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In the course of my literature-based research, I came across very little analysis of the non-financial
aspects of the PRV program. In speaking with some industry executives, however, non-financial
concerns began to emerge.
Even before the PRV legislation was enacted, several large pharma companies including
GlaxoSmithKline, Wyeth, Novartis, and Merck had ongoing research in neglected disease indications
(54). Some companies even had divisions dedicated to this research. Will new market incentives spur
even more investment in these areas? One would think so, but in speaking with some industry
executives, there was significant hesitation. One executive asked, should we even be trying to create
market incentives for neglected disease research?
To understand this hesitation, one must ask why pharma has started to invest in neglected disease
research at all, and the answer lies at least in part in the image problem of Big Pharma to the public. In a
2005 survey, less than half of US consumers had a favorable view of the pharmaceutical industry (56).
Investing in neglected diseases, a potentially visible form of corporate social responsibility, could be
seen as a way to regain some favor in the public eye. By adding market driven incentives to this mix,
however, the perceived altruism of the investment is reduced if not lost.
Will this impact the value of the PRV? It's unclear, but at a minimum it may delay resolving some of the
uncertainties around the program. Moreover, venture investors that I spoke with were highly skeptical
about the potential of a PRV to spur an acquisition, which would otherwise be a desirable externality of
the program. Given that the uncertainty surrounding PRVs isn't likely to be resolved anytime soon, this
mechanism can only be viewed as an at-risk bonus.
The Timing Problem
For the neglected disease focused small biotech company, it is important to note that the issuance of a
PRV does not directly address the problem of providing early stage funding, as the issuance of the PRV
occurs only after a company has successfully developed and received FDA approval for the drug. This
brings to light the fact that AMC and PRV incentives are only useful to the early stage entrepreneur if
they can be turned in to cash, via either selling of the rights to the incentive or by creating a risk/reward
profile attractive to investors. If the market design mechanisms fail to provide either of these to the
entrepreneur, then the value of the programs will only be realized by big pharmaceutical companies
that have adequate working capital to finance the pursuit of the incentives. As noted by Andrew Farlow
in 2005 and shown in Scenario 8, the higher cost of capital for a small biotech company relative to a
large pharmaceutical company also affects their ability to leverage the pull incentive schemes (57).
This timing problem illustrates the need for new, innovative financing mechanisms that can provide a
way for global health companies to capitalize on the future value of a monetizable asset. Symphony
Capital Partners introduced one such innovation for developed world applications. At a simplified level,
the company purchased the rights to a clinical stage product (or group of products) from a biotech
company and set up a new company to further develop the program. The purchase agreement included
an option for the originating biotech company to buy back the rights at a pre-set price. In effect,
Symphony provided timely, at-risk financing for clinical trials (58).
Figure 23: Symphony Capital Model (15)
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Could a similar model be applied for neglected disease? The Fast Track Option described in the
overview has not gained any real traction, but a similarly structured PRV option could be imagined.
Using the profile of this research, a time valued, risk-adjusted value of a $300M option on a PRV would
be approximately $17M1 7 . Similar to a decision for a small biotech of whether to partner a lead
program, a neglected disease company would need to evaluate the benefits of monetizing the future
value of the voucher. It is not clear, however, whether pharma would be interested in purchasing such
an option. The uncertainty around the underlying value of the voucher again makes such an evaluation
difficult.
Finally, interim milestone payments that mimic the prize mechanism in this research could also be a
useful addition to the list of pull incentives (59). As another form of a push/pull hybrid mechanism,
17 $17.8M = $300M PRV price, risk adjusted for a preclinical stage company and discounted 6 years using 11% for
cost of capital, that of the option holder
such a milestone would require clear language related to "winning" the milestone, and decisions around
how to structure the incentive would need to be made.
Given the variety of pull mechanisms being put in place for global health applications, some set of
financial instruments and/or incentives could be imagined that would provide the small biotech
company with needed cash during early stage clinical development.
Combinations of Mechanisms
As shown in the results, combining prizes, PRVs and AMCs together can have a dramatic impact. Given
that AMC prices are set in advance and PRVs are market driven, establishing a credible market price for
the voucher could reduce the size of the AMC needed to attract investment. This was most clearly
illustrated in Figure 16 and Table 5, where an increase in PRV valuation from $113M to $220M allowed
the required AMC price to drop from $15 to $10 for the profiled scenario. While the quantitative
relationship between these variables is specific to the model, the qualitative relationship is
generalizable.
As noted earlier, price is critical for establishing a viable market, and a viable exit, among other factors,
is critical for attracting investment. Given that AMCs and PRVs are still unproven, how should a global
health entrepreneur proceed?
Dual market strategy
In conversations with venture capitalists and entrepreneurs for this research, I asked if a dual market
strategy was necessary to pursue a neglected disease indication. A consensus (n=8, split between
industry and venture) formed around the need to maximize return on investment, and the only likely
way to do that in today's environment is via a dual market strategy. With that said, the potential of
PRVs as a game-changer was noted.
Given the current environment, a dual market strategy is almost certainly necessary to attract private
sector investment. Leveraging push mechanisms, a company should be able to invest in a neglected
disease indication while simultaneously helping to finance the developed world indication. Creating a
partnership with a PPP should also be fully evaluated, either in the form of a co-development
partnership or a straight out-licensing deal. If the latter option is chosen, the entrepreneur would be
well advised to consider the rights to a PRV, even if the value of the voucher is wildly uncertain.
4.2 Conclusion
The simulation data presented in this thesis clearly reflect the inherent tensions in trying to motivate
research for neglected diseases. Finding the optimal balance between the social benefit of a neglected
disease therapeutic and the need for investors to pursue a financial return commensurate with the risk
of the investment will continue to be a struggle, but having market design mechanisms like PRVs and
AMCs in place are an intriguing place to start. The question is, and will continue to be going forward,
how much do they help? Further, what combination of incentives offers the greatest benefit to society
at the lowest cost? These questions are particularly relevant for PRVs, where the value of the incentive
is left to the market, versus AMCs and prizes where the values of the incentives are determined by
stakeholders and are explicitly communicated to interested parties.
Once the value of PRVs can be more precisely approximated, another review of the incentives available
to neglected disease researchers would be warranted. Having a clearer understanding of the PRV
incentive would also allow for additional case studies to be performed, similar to the model prepared
here and case studies created by BIO Ventures for Global Health (55). Finally, research into the use of
options to monetize the value of some of these incentives could provide new strategies for addressing
the timing problem of the market design mechanisms for an early stage biotech company.
Like any startup company, the neglected disease focused biotech company will need to take full
advantage of the push mechanisms available to it and seek the most capital-efficient path to market.
Utilizing prizes, obtaining grants, and partnering with PDPs can improve the financial prospects of the
company both by reducing total capital required and by delaying the timing of the equity investment
rounds.
Until and unless the uncertainties related to the AMC and PRV models are resolved, and until venture
capitalists can envision an exit for a purely developing world global health company, a dual market
strategy offers the best opportunity for a company interested in pursuing a neglected disease
therapeutic to balance social interest with financial return. A recovery of the public capital markets will
not significantly alter this conclusion, as the capped upside of pull mechanisms like the AMC will only
attract a limited set of investors that are comfortable sacrificing financial return for social value.
New incentive schemes will be needed to further resolve the tension between social interest and
financial return with less waste, and that can also be utilized or monetized by a small biotech company
during the time between preclinical research and clinical proof of concept. Timely, targeted, incentives
for early stage biotech companies could open the door to a new set of entrants in neglected disease
research, diversifying the potential approaches to new therapeutics. These incentives will likely need to
be different, but ideally coordinated, from those targeting companies with significant working capital
and relatively lower costs of capital.
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Chapter 5: Appendix
5.1 Simulation Data Output from Scenarios
Scenario 1 Table
Acq VC VC
Price/Dose Cash NPV to Value at Multiple, Series Multiple, Series
(AMC) Grant firm Prize PRV Launch Series A A IRR Series B B IRR
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 5.4 51% 4.3 62%
5M push $20.16 $5.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 5.9 73% 4.7 117%
10M push $20.16 $10.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 6.6 76% 5.2 129%
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.18 $5.00 $0.00 $329 5.9 57% 4.7 117%
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.83 $10.00 $0.00 $327 6.5 59% 5.2 128%
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.01 $0.00 $25.00 $347 5.6 52% 4.5 65%
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.43 $0.00 $50.00 $364 5.9 54% 4.7 68%
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $1.29 $0.00 $100.00 $396 6.4 57% 5.1 73%
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $2.99 $0.00 $200.00 $461 7.5 63% 6.0 82%
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $6.40 $0.00 $400.00 $591 9.6 72% 7.7 97%
Scenario 2 Table
Acq VC VC
Price/Dose Cash NPV to Value at Multiple, Series Multiple, Series
(AMC) Grant firm Prize PRV Launch Series A A IRR Series B B IRR
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 5.4 51% 4.3 62%
25M push $20.16 $25.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 9.8 268% 7.8 680%
25M prize $20.16 $0.00 $2.28 $25.00 $0.00 $325 8.8 64% 7.1 166%
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.01 $0.00 $25.00 $347 5.6 52% 4.5 65%
Scenario 3 Table
Acq VC VC
Price/Dose Cash NPV to Value at Multiple, Series Multiple, Series
(AMC) Grant firm Prize PRV Launch Series A A IRR Series B B IRR
Base Case $21.33 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $357 5.8 53% 4.6 67%
5M push $21.33 $5.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $357 6.4 77% 5.1 126%
10M push $21.33 $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $357 7.1 80% 5.7 138%
5M prize $19.69 $0.00 $0.00 $5.00 $0.00 $318 5.7 56% 4.5 113%
1OM prize $18.05 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $0.00 $280 5.6 53% 4.4 111%
25M PRV $20.14 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $25.00 $347 5.6 52% 4.5 65%
50M PRV $19.04 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $50.00 $339 5.5 52% 4.4 64%
100M PRV $16.85 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $100.00 $322 5.2 50% 4.2 61%
200M PRV $12.47 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $200.00 $289 4.7 46% 3.7 55%
400M PRV $4.54 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $400.00 $222 3.6 37% 2.9 42%
Scenario 4 Table
Acq VC VC
Price/Dose Cash NPV to Value at Multiple, Series Multiple, Series
(AMC) Grant firm Prize PRV Launch Series A A IRR Series B B IRR
Base Case $19.17 $0.00 -$0.85 $0.00 $0 $308 5.0 48% 4.0 59%
5M push $17.92 $5.00 -$1.34 $0.00 $0 $280 5.0 65% 4.0 100%
10M push $16.67 $10.00 -$1.83 $0.00 $0 $252 5.0 63% 4.0 100%
5M prize $17.92 $0.00 -$0.70 $5.00 $0 $278 5.0 51% 4.0 99%
O1M prize $16.81 $0.00 -$0.49 $10.00 $0 $252 5.0 50% 4.0 100%
25M PRV $18.41 $0.00 -$0.67 $0.00 $25 $308 5.0 48% 4.0 59%
50M PRV $17.68 $0.00 -$0.53 $0.00 $50 $308 5.0 48% 4.0 59%
100M PRV $16.23 $0.00 -$0.24 $0.00 $100 $308 5.0 48% 4.0 59%
200M PRV $13.33 $0.00 $0.34 $0.00 $200 $308 5.0 48% 4.0 59%
400M PRV $7.53 $0.00 $1.49 $0.00 $400 $308 5.0 48% 4.0 59%
Scenario 5 Table
Acq VC
Price/ Value VC Multipl % reduction
Dose Cash NPV to at Multiple, Series A e, from $5 Base
(AMC) Grant firm Prize PRV Launch Series A IRR Series B Case
Base Case $5.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $384 $227 3.7 38% 2.9 100%
5M push $5.00 $5.00 $0.00 $0.00 $384 $227 4.1 55% 3.2 0%
10M push $5.00 $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $384 $227 4.5 58% 3.6 0%
5M prize $5.00 $0.00 $0.00 $5.00 $347 $201 3.6 40% 2.9 10%
10M prize $5.00 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $310 $175 3.5 37% 2.8 19%
Base Case $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $256 $270 4.4 44% 3.5 33%
5M push $10.00 $5.00 $0.00 $0.00 $256 $270 4.8 63% 3.9 0%
O1M push $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $256 $270 5.4 67% 4.3 33%
5M prize $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $5.00 $219 $244 4.4 46% 3.5 43%
10M prize $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $182 $218 4.3 45% 3.5 53%
Base Case $15.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $142 $308 5.0 48% 4.0 63%
5M push $15.00 $5.00 $0.00 $0.00 $142 $308 5.5 70% 4.4 63%
O1M push $15.00 $10.00 $0.00 $0.00 $142 $308 6.1 73% 4.9 63%
5M prize $15.00 $0.00 $0.00 $5.00 $105 $282 5.0 51% 4.0 73%
10M prize $15.00 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $68 $256 5.1 50% 4.1 82%
Scenario 6 Tables
Acq
Value VC
Price/Dose Beginning at Multiple, Series
Cap=50 (AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV Launch Series A A IRR
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 5.4 51%
5M push $20.16 $5.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 5.9 73%
10M push $20.16 $10.00 -$0.46 $0.00 $0.00 $330 6.6 76%
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.18 $5.00 $0.00 $329 5.9 57%
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.83 $10.00 $0.00 $327 6.5 59%
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.01 $0.00 $25.00 $347 5.6 52%
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.43 $0.00 $50.00 $364 5.9 54%
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $1.29 $0.00 $100.00 $396 6.4 57%
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $2.99 $0.00 $200.00 $461 7.5 63%
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $6.40 $0.00 $400.00 $591 9.6 72%
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $24.49 $347 5.6 52%
Min PRV
w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 -$43.74 $297 5.9 55%
Scenario 6 Tables, continued
Acq
Value VC
Price/Dose Beginning at Multiple, Series
Cap=100 (AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV Launch Series A A IRR
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$6.59 $0.00 $0.00 $346 2.9 37%
5M push $20.16 $5.00 -$6.59 $0.00 $0.00 $346 3.0 40%
10M push $20.16 $10.00 -$6.59 $0.00 $0.00 $346 3.2 51%
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$5.94 $5.00 $0.00 $344 3.0 39%
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$5.29 $10.00 $0.00 $343 3.2 40%
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$6.09 $0.00 $25.00 $363 3.1 39%
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$5.62 $0.00 $50.00 $380 3.2 41%
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$4.73 $0.00 $100.00 $414 3.5 44%
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$3.02 $0.00 $200.00 $479 4.0 50%
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.39 $0.00 $400.00 $609 5.1 60%
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $377.40 $594 5.0 59%
Min PRV
w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $303.08 $542 5.0 58%
Acq
Value VC
Price/Dose Beginning at Multiple, Series
Cap=150 (AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV Launch Series A A IRR
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$12.77 $0.00 $0.00 $360 2.1 24%
5M push $20.16 $5.00 -$12.77 $0.00 $0.00 $360 2.1 25%
10M push $20.16 $10.00 -$12.77 $0.00 $0.00 $360 2.2 33%
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$12.12 $5.00 $0.00 $358 2.1 25%
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$11.47 $10.00 $0.00 $357 2.2 26%
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$12.26 $0.00 $25.00 $378 2.2 25%
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$11.75 $0.00 $50.00 $396 2.3 27%
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$10.78 $0.00 $100.00 $430 2.5 30%
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$9.04 $0.00 $200.00 $496 2.9 35%
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$5.63 $0.00 $400.00 $626 3.6 44%
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $730.31 $841 4.8 55%
Min PRV
w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $655.99 $789 4.8 56%
Scenario 7 Table
Acq
Price/Dose Beginning Total Cap NPV to Value at
(AMC) Cash Required firm Prize PRV Launch
Max Cap $15.00 $10.00 $54.60 $0.00 $10.00 $100 $274.09
Max Cap $15.00 $10.00 $68.70 $0.00 $10.00 $200 $329.88
Max Cap $15.00 $10.00 $82.90 $0.00 $10.00 $300 $385.67
Max Cap $15.00 $10.00 $97.10 $0.00 $10.00 $400 $441.47
Scenario 8 Tables
Pharma, cost of capital=11%
Price/Dose NPV to
Cap=50 (AMC) firm PRV
Base
Case $20.16 $0.00 -$231.00
AMC=5 $5.00 $0.00 $285.00
AMC=10 $10.00 $0.00 $91.00
AMC=15 $15.00 $0.00 -$72.00
Price/Dose NPV to
Cap=100 (AMC) firm PRV
Base
Case $20.16 $0.00 -$25.00
AMC=5 $5.00 $0.00 $512.00
AMC=10 $10.00 $0.00 $318.00
AMC=15 $15.00 $0.00 $146.00
Price/Dose NPV to
Cap=150 (AMC) firm PRV
Base
Case $20.16 $0.00 $195.00
AMC=5 $5.00 $0.00 $739.00
AMC=10 $10.00 $0.00 $545.00
AMC=15 $15.00 $0.00 $373.00
Biotech, cost of capital=25%
Price/Dose NPV to
Cap=50 (AMC) firm PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 $24.00
AMC=5 $5.00 $0.00 $384.28
AMC=10 $10.00 $0.00 $256.23
AMC=15 $15.00 $0.00 $142.19
Price/Dose NPV to
Cap=100 (AMC) firm PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 $377.00
AMC=5 $5.00 $0.00 $737.00
AMC=10 $10.00 $0.00 $609.00
AMC=15 $15.00 $0.00 $495.00
Price/Dose NPV to
Cap=150 (AMC) firm PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 $730.00
AMC=5 $5.00 $0.00 $1,090.00
AMC=10 $10.00 $0.00 $962.00
AMC=15 $15.00 $0.00 $848.00
5.2 Sensitivity Analyses
Cost of Capital
Cost of Capital = 20%
Price/Dose Beginning
(AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 $1.47 $0.00 $0.00
10M push $20.16 $10.00 $1.47 $0.00 $0.00
20M push $20.16 $20.00 $1.47 $0.00 $0.00
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 $2.19 $5.00 $0.00
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 $2.91 $10.00 $0.00
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $2.06 $0.00 $25.00
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $2.60 $0.00 $50.00
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $3.69 $0.00 $100.00
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $5.87 $0.00 $200.00
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 -$60.17
Min PRV w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 -$117.51
Cost of Capital = 30%
Price/Dose Beginning
(AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$1.59 $0.00 $0.00
5M push $20.16 $5.00 -$1.59 $0.00 $0.00
10M push $20.16 $10.00 -$1.59 $0.00 $0.00
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$1.02 $5.00 $0.00
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$0.44 $10.00 $0.00
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$1.22 $0.00 $25.00
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$0.88 $0.00 $50.00
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$0.21 $0.00 $100.00
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $1.14 $0.00 $200.00
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $3.83 $0.00 $400.00
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $115.40
Min PRV w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $31.13
Cost of Capital = 11%
Price/Dose Beginning
(AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 $8.96 $0.00 $0.00
5M push $20.16 $5.00 $8.96 $0.00 $0.00
10M push $20.16 $10.00 $8.96 $0.00 $0.00
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 $9.85 $5.00 $0.00
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 $10.73 $10.00 $0.00
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $9.87 $0.00 $25.00
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $10.74 $0.00 $50.00
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $12.48 $0.00 $100.00
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $15.95 $0.00 $200.00
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $22.90 $0.00 $400.00
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 -$230.99
Min PRV w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 -$275.14
$0.00 1 $10.22 $0.00 1 $400.00$20.16I 400M PRV
Gross Margin
Margin = 40%
Price/Dose Beginning
(AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$0.97 $0.00 $0.00
5M push $20.16 $5.00 -$0.97 $0.00 $0.00
10M push $20.16 $10.00 -$0.97 $0.00 $0.00
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$0.33 $5.00 $0.00
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.31 $10.00 $0.00
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$0.50 $0.00 $25.00
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$0.08 $0.00 $50.00
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.78 $0.00 $100.00
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $2.48 $0.00 $200.00
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $5.89 $0.00 $400.00
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $54.43
Min PRV w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 -$16.51
Margin = 60%
Price/Dose Beginning
(AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 $0.02 $0.00 $0.00
5M push $20.16 $5.00 $0.02 $0.00 $0.00
10M push $20.16 $10.00 $0.02 $0.00 $0.00
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.66 $5.00 $0.00
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 $1.30 $10.00 $0.00
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.48 $0.00 $25.00
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.90 $0.00 $50.00
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $1.76 $0.00 $100.00
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $3.46 $0.00 $200.00
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $6.87 $0.00 $400.00
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 -$0.89
Min PRV w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 -$67.62
Quantity Sold
Quantity Sold = 6M
Price/Dose Beginning
(AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 -$2.44 $0.00 $0.00
5M push $20.16 $5.00 -$2.44 $0.00 $0.00
10M push $20.16 $10.00 -$2.44 $0.00 $0.00
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$1.79 $5.00 $0.00
O1M prize $20.16 $0.00 -$1.15 $10.00 $0.00
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$1.96 $0.00 $25.00
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$1.52 $0.00 $50.00
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 -$0.67 $0.00 $100.00
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $1.03 $0.00 $200.00
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $4.44 $0.00 $400.00
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $139.45
Min PRV w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 $65.13
Quantity Sold = 10M
Price/Dose Beginning
(AMC) Cash NPV to firm Prize PRV
Base Case $20.16 $0.00 $1.52 $0.00 $0.00
5M push $20.16 $5.00 $1.52 $0.00 $0.00
10M push $20.16 $10.00 $1.52 $0.00 $0.00
5M prize $20.16 $0.00 $2.80 $10.00 $0.00
10M prize $20.16 $0.00 $1.97 $0.00 $25.00
25M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $1.97 $0.00 $25.00
50M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $2.39 $0.00 $50.00
100M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $3.25 $0.00 $100.00
200M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $4.95 $0.00 $200.00
400M PRV $20.16 $0.00 $8.36 $0.00 $400.00
Min PRV $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 -$79.28
Min PRV w/Prize $20.16 $0.00 $0.00 $10.00 -$143.16
